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Abstract
This Article will summarize Argentine law on government contracts as it exists today, with
special reference to the contracts of the Federal Government. Due to the French origin of the theory
and to the fact that this Article is addressed to an American readership, a tentative comparison
with the main legal rules on the subject of these two countries will be offered. A discussion of
the practical consequences of the application of the administrative contract doctrine, and some
possible solutions to the problems created thereby will be then put forward. But first, the basic
issues that this doctrine gives rise to will be defined and the French origin of the concept of contract
administratif and its reception in Argentina will be explained. The analysis offered will be limited
to the general substantive legal regime of Government contracts leaving aside the issues arising
from the contracting procedure, i.e., the rules on competitive bidding. To the extent that this
substantive regime results from laws and regulations, only those directly applicable to Government
contracts shall be considered. Thus, the analysis will only deal tangentially with the impact on
these contracts of the exercise of public powers granted by statutes that may affect indirectly the
performance of the private contractor. Since such statutes may reach all Government contracts and
not only those defined as “administrative” (unless a tautological definition is used, i.e., one that
characterizes as “administrative” only those Government contracts that can be reached by laws
granting regulatory or police powers to the Government), it may be argued that the issues raised
by those statutes lie outside the scope of the doctrine of the administrative contract. Therefore, the
issue of the conflict between the legislative powers of the State and the principle of the sanctity of
the contract shall not be treated.
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INTRODUCTION
The subject of Government contracts is not one that seems,
to a foreign observer, to generate a great intellectual debate in
the U.S. legal circles.' Apart from a few special rules that deviate
from common law solutions, i.e., no apparent authority of Gov-
ernment agents, restricted admission of estoppel against the
Government, absent a specific statute or regulation, the rules of
general contract law apply.2 While legal literature on the subject
and specialized lawjournals exist, and courses on the subject are
included in the curricula of many law schools, for an outside
observer it would appear that much of the discussion dwells on
the issues raised by the numerous laws and regulations gov-
erning public procurement, both during the competitive bid-
ding and the contract performance stages, and on the construc-
tion of complex clauses included in every supply or works agree-
ment with the Federal Government. Indeed, looking at the bulk
of the federal procurement regulations, and the clauses that they
require to be inserted in the agreements, a layman could well
wonder how can any controversies arise with respect to contracts
* The author is professor of Administrative Law in the Law School of the National
University of Buenos Aires, and partner of the Buenos Aires law firm Marval, O'Farrell
& Mairal. The views and the translations of foreign terminology offered in this Article
are strictly those of the author. All translations from foreign languages are done by the
author, unless otherwise mentioned.
1. The present Article draws partially from a previous paper of the author, De la
peligrosidad o inutilidad de una teonfa general del contrato administrativo, 179 E.D. 655
(1998). This work started a controversy in Argentina on the theory of the administra-
tive contract. For a reply, restating the traditional point of view, seeJuan C. Cassagne,
Un intento doctrinario infrictuoso: El rechazo de lafigura del contrato administrativo, 180 E.D.
773 (1999).
2. See JoHN CIBINIC., JR. & RALPH! C. NASIH, JR., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CON-
TRACTS 203 (3d ed. 1998) (citing Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407
(1947));JoriN CIBINICJR. & RALh-i C. NAs-, JR., AIMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT CON-
ThRA(:I-S 30-33, 69-77 (3d ed. 1995) (citing Federal Crop his. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S.
380 (1947)); W. NOEL KEYFS, GOVFRNMENT CONTRACTS UNDER THIE FEDERAL ACQUISITION
REGULATION 27 (2d ed. 1996); EUGENE W. MASSFN;ALF', FUNDAMENTALS Oh FFDERAL CON-
TRACT LAW 8-10, 45-49 (1991).
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that seem to foresee, with meticulous detail, every possible con-
tingency.3
A very different situation confronts those who wish to study
Government contracts in Argentina. These contracts may in-
clude lengthy specifications, and the procurement procedure
does give rise to many issues, but the main discussion is of a
more general nature, namely: do some Government contracts,
called by courts and legal scholars "administrative contracts,"4
belong to a different species than agreements between private
parties? If so, how can these administrative contracts be identi-
fied? And once identified, what rules apply to them that differ
from those that would obtain under general contract law?
Common law lawyers have little patience with discussions of
a very general nature. They tend to agree with the poet William
Blake who thought that "[t]o particularize is the alone distinc-
tion of merit." However, the matter is not devoid of practical
importance: many foreign contractors have been surprised to
discover, to their chagrin, that their agreements with the Argen-
tine Government were significantly affected by underlying prin-
ciples of administrative law not spelled out in the contractual
documents and which, in their view, destroyed the very notion of
a contract.
Although probably more acute in Argentina than elsewhere,
the problem is not restricted to Argentine law. Because the the-
ory behind this concept of special Government contracts
originated in France, a country that has influenced greatly Latin
American law and culture, many countries in the region have
adopted it.' There is also a good deal of cross-fertilization in
Latin American law; hence, it is not uncommon to find Argen-
tine legal scholars citing Brazilian, Chilean and Uruguayan legal
3. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. Sec. 1, et seq. [hereinafter F.A.R.].
4. Because of the differences between the French rules on contrats administratifs
and the Argentine doctrine of the administrative contract, the French expression shall
be used when discussing the French system, while the term "administrative contract"
shall be used with respect to the Argentine regime.
5. This is the case with Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay and Venezuela. See, e.g.,
LUCIA VALLE FIGUEIREDO, CURSO DE DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVE 310 (1994); ENRIQUE SILVA
CIMMA, DERECiHO ADMINISTRATIVO CHILENO Y COMPARADO: Acros, CONTRATOS Y BIENES
163 (1995); JAIME VIDAL PERDOMO, DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO 314 (9th ed. 1987); EN-
RIQUE SAYAGUES LASO, 1 TRArADO DE DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO 528-40 (3d ed. 1963);
ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, CONTRATOs ADMINISTRATIVOS (1992). These authors repeat-
edly cite French administrative law scholars.
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authors and vice-versa. 6 Thus, legal doctrines imported or devel-
oped in one country are often taken into account by its neigh-
bors.
The matter has already been noticed in the United States.
American legal scholars have commented on the difficulty for
developing countries that follow French administrative law theo-
ries, of adopting modern business law techniques necessary for
project finance. International lending agencies that have been
confronted with the problem have commissioned studies on the
same issue, and have arrived at similar conclusions.7
This Article will summarize Argentine law on government
contracts as it exists today, with special reference to the contracts
of the Federal Government. Due to the French origin of the
theory and to the fact that this Article is addressed to an Ameri-
can readership, a tentative comparison with the main legal rules
on the subject of these two countries will be offered. A discus-
sion of the practical consequences of the application of the ad-
ministrative contract doctrine, and some possible solutions to
the problems created thereby will be then put forward. But first,
the basic issues that this doctrine gives rise to will be defined and
the French origin of the concept of contrat administratif and its
reception in Argentina will be explained.
The analysis offered will be limited to the general substan-
tive legal regime of Government contracts leaving aside the is-
sues arising from the contracting procedure, i.e., the rules on
competitive bidding. To the extent that this substantive regime
results from laws and regulations, only those directly applicable
to Government contracts shall be considered. Thus, the analysis
will only deal tangentially with the impact on these contracts of
the exercise of public powers granted by statutes that may affect
indirectly the performance of the private contractor. Since such
statutes may reach all Government contracts and not only those
defined as "administrative" (unless a tautological definition is
used, i.e., one that characterizes as "administrative" only those
6. For citations of Argentine administrative law writers found in all works, see supra
n.5. See also AGUSTIN GORDILLO, TRATADO DE DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO (4th ed. 1997).
7. See Alejandro P. Radzyminski, Legal Obstacles and Incentives to Private Investment in
Infrastructure Concessions, in CAN PRIVATIZATION DELIVER? INFRASTRUCTrURE FOR LATIN
AMERICA 33-78 (Federico Basafies et al., eds., 1999). See also Nal Burman & Don Wallace
Jr., 2000 and Beyond-The Private Law Side of International Economic Law: Taking Stock,
29(3) INT'L L. NEWS 16 (2000).
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Government contracts that can be reached by laws granting reg-
ulatory or police powers to the Government), it may be argued
that the issues raised by those statutes lie outside the scope of the
doctrine of the administrative contract. Therefore, the issue of
the conflict between the legislative powers of the State and the
principle of the sanctity of the contract shall not be treated.8
The economic crises that have afflicted the Argentine econ-
omy from the late 1980s to the present have led to the repeated
enactment of legislation designed, generally, to mitigate the ef-
fects of the crises and, more specifically, to allow the Govern-
ment to reduce its contractual commitments. Although this leg-
islation has had a significant impact on Government contracts it
will not be covered as it is, or should be, of a temporary nature
and raises other issues of constitutional and international law as
well.9 For the same reason, the existence and consequences of
8. J.D.B. MITCHELL, THE CONTRACTS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY (1954) (dealing with this subject). In France this issue is treated within the sub-
ject of the contrat administratif under the theory of the fait du 1n-ince.
9. When President Menem came into power in 1989, the Argentine Congress
passed a law allowing the Executive to renegotiate all contracts entered into before a
given cut-off date that coincided approximately with the beginning of the new adminis-
tration. Law No. 23696, Aug. 18, 1989, [XLIX-C] A.D.L.A. 2444, 2451. Such renegoti-
ation was to be guided by the principle of "shared sacrifice", i.e., a sharing of the bur-
dens imposed by the economic crisis of the time (such as the increase of prices brought
about by hyperinflation) between the two parties to the contract. If renegotiation
failed, the Government was empowered to terminate the contract without compensat-
ing the contractor for loss of profits. A subsequent law consolidated the public debt
and made claims against the Government arising prior to April 1, 1991 and resulting
from judicial awards, payable in Government bonds with a maturity of sixteen years.
Law No. 23982, Aug. 22, 1991, [LI-C] A.D.L.A. 2898, 2900.
A similar law allowing the Executive to renegotiate and terminate Government
contracts was passed by the Argentine Congress in 2000, during the term of President
de la Rdia. Law No. 25344, Nov. 11, 2000, [LX-E] A.D.L.A. 5547. In this case the cut-off
date was exactly the day on which the new President was sworn in, although no eco-
nomic crisis existed at the time. The same principle of "shared sacrifice" and the same
rule of termination without compensating loss of profits were imposed by this law.
At the beginning of 2002, a yet new Emergency Law was passed. Law No. 25561,
Jan. 7, 2002, [LXII-A] A.D.L.A. 44. It eliminated the one-to-one correlation between
the U.S. dollar and the Argentine peso that had existed since the Convertibility Law of
1991, Law No. 23928, Mar. 27, 1991, [LI-B] A. D. L. A. 1752, thus leading to a major
devaluation of the local currency. However, the same Emergency Law provided that
utility rates, that had until then been tied to the dollar, were to be converted into pesos
at the one-to-one rate previously in force, and empowered the Executive to renegotiate
the concession agreements. Major utilities that had borrowed abroad heavily to comply
with their investment programs have thus found themselves with a frozen peso income
to service huge debts in foreign currency. Several foreign investors in these utility com-
panies have announced their intention to seek remedies under the different bilateral
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the sovereign power to enact laws expropriating contractual
rights of specific private parties will be omitted."0
I. THE MAIN ISSUES POSED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONTRACT DOCTRINE
That a State does not resign its sovereign powers by entering
into a contract is a principle known in the common law world.
J.D.B. Mitchell's classic book on Government contracts dealt at
length with this issue." The famous Amphitrite 9 case in England
stated precisely that rule which has also been followed in the
United States."3 However, the theory of the administrative con-
tract poses a different question, namely whether the Govern-
ment, by the simple fact of having entered into a contract, and
regardless of the existence of any laws that grant to it powers
that, when exercised, may affect directly or indirectly the rights
and obligations of the private contractor, has the power to adjust
or terminate the contract for reasons of public convenience in
the absence of any contractual clauses in the agreement itself or
incorporated into it by reference to a regulation, granting it
such powers, and even if the contract itself cannot be said to
involve typical sovereign prerogatives.
Put in more general terms, the issue is whether an adminis-
trative agency possesses powers "within" the contract that it has
executed with a private contractor so that it may conduct itself in
its relations with such contractor as a sovereign person without
any need of invoking statutes granting it public prerogatives.
This means, in turn, that the contractor must treat all Govern-
ment pronouncements made within the framework of the agree-
ment as administrative decisions that must be obeyed unless and
until set aside by a court of law, without prejudice to the contrac-
tor's right to additional compensation if such orders impose on
him burdens in excess of those contemplated by the agreement.
investment protection treaties signed by Argentina with the majority of the capital ex-
porting countries.
10. Argentine law allows the expropriation of contractual rights. See JoRGF, L.
MAIORANO, LA EXPROPIACION EN LA LFY 21499 45 (1978).
11. MITCHELL, supra n.8.
12. Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v. The King, [1921] 3 K.B. 500.
13. New York & N.E. R. Co. Rey. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 567 (1894) ("A govern-
mental power of self protection cannot be contracted away"); Norman v. Baltimore &
0. R. Co. 294 U.S. 240, 307 (1935) ("Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the
constitutional authority of the Congress").
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A U.S. lawyer specializing in Government contracts may
think he is treading familiar ground here. After all, contractual
clauses that follow the Federal Acquisition Regulations ("FAR")
do grant to the U.S. Government the right to direct the work of
the contractor, 4 require the latter to abide by the change orders
given by the contracting officer," and set short time limits to the
complaints that may be brought against such orders. 6 Stretch-
ing somewhat the comparison, if the relation between a regu-
lated industry and the Government were to be construed as one
based on a contract, i.e., as a concession granted by the latter to
the former to build and operate a utility, then the power to regu-
late the industry could be depicted as the power to amend the
initial conditions of the concession contract.' 7 Such is, precisely,
the solution under the administrative contract theory.
But what would surprise the U.S. lawyer is both the broad
reach of the concept of "administrative contract" and the unde-
termined nature of its consequences. As will be seen below,
many contracts that in the United States would not normally
contain clauses granting special rights to the Government and
that do not concern a regulated industry, are considered, never-
theless, to be administrative contracts in Argentina. The inde-
pendence of these government prerogatives from the existence
of contractual clauses that recognize them or of regulatory pow-
ers arising from statute, create a double type of uncertainty:
first, which contracts are included in the concept of "administra-
14. Inspection of Construction clause reads, in part: "All work shall be conducted
under the general direction of the Contracting Officer and is subject to Government
inspection and test. at all places and at all reasonable times before acceptance to ensure
strict compliance with the terms of the contract". 48 C.F.R. Sec. 52.246-12(b). See also
Ralph C. Nash, jr. & John Cibinic, Jr., Administration of Government Contracts, in KEYES,
supra n.2, at 789-811 (2d ed. 1969)
15. Change orders are mandatory if the change falls "within the general scope of
the contract" and it is included among the type of changes authorized by the contract.
Failure to comply with a change order may lead to the contractor being default termi-
nated. The contractor should comply and seek equitable adjustment of its compensa-
tion. /d. at 384, 407.
16. According to the FAR, the contractor must assert its right to an adjustment
within thirty days from the receipt of the change order. However, this time limit has
been construed liberally in favor of the contractor so as not to bar a late claim unless
the Government has been prejudiced by the delay. 48 C.F.R. Sec. 52.243-1 (c). See also
NASI-I & CtBINIC, supra n.14, at 477-81
17. See MITCiHELL, sUpra n.8, at 120-29 (dealing with the effects of rate regulation
on existing contracts with public agencies).
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tive contract"; and second, what are the consequences of such
inclusion.
II. THE FRENCH ORIGIN OF THE THEORY
The constitutional principle of the separation of powers has
been construed in France, since the 1789 Revolution, as a bar for
the judiciary to intervene in any controversy involving the Gov-
ernment when acting as a public entity.' 8 Since it was not con-
ceivable to deprive those private persons who were affected by
the exercise of public powers of all redress, it became necessary
to create a system of administrative courts, separate from the ju-
dicial ones, to adjudicate the controversies that concern the Gov-
ernment and are ruled, thus, by administrative law. Thus, dur-
ing the 19th century, the Conseil d'Etat, originally an advisory
body within the Administration, evolved into a full fledged ad-
ministrative court. In 1953, lower administrative courts with gen-
eral jurisdiction were organized, and a 1987 law created the ad-
ministrative courts of appeals."l ' Final decisions issued by the ad-
ministrative courts may not be appealed to the judicial courts. °
The existence of a separate administrative jurisdiction has
made it necessary, in turn, to distinguish which of the contracts
entered into by the Administration fall under the jurisdiction of
the administrative courts (contrats administratifs) and which are,
instead, to be treated as ordinary contracts subject to the juris-
diction of the judicial courts.2'
This distinction, recognized by French authors as one of the
most complex issues of French administrative law, would require
many pages to be explained fully. Initially, all controversies aris-
18. The law of August 16-24, 1790, provided: "Judicial functions are and will always
remain distinct from administrative functions. Judges may not, tinder penalty of forfei-
ture of office, interfere in any manner with the workings of administrative bodies, nor
summon administrators before them in connection (with the exercise) of their func-
tion". See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, FRENCH AMIN1STiRLATIVE LAW AND TIHE COMMON-LAW
WORL) 6-8 (1954). On the current construction of this constitutional principle, and its
limits, See YVES GAUDEMEr, TRArI DE DROr ADMINISTRATIF 331-35 (16th ed. 2001).
19. On the system of administrative courts in France, see REN CIAtpus, DROll DU
CoNrE:N'nEUx ADMINIS'rRATIF 53-97 (9th ed. 2001); see aLso GAUDEMET, supra n. 18, at 327-
73.
20. GAUDEMET, supra n.18, at 346-47.
21. The main French text on the subject is ANDRI DE LAUBADPRE El AL., TRAIT DES
CONTRATS ADMINSTRArIFS (2d ed. 1984). A more modern but shorter work is LAURENT
RICHER. DRorr DES CONrRATS ADMINISTRATIFS (3d ed. 2002).
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ing under government contracts were allocated to the judicial
courts, unless a law declared them subject to the administrative
jurisdiction, as happened for cases of public works and supply
contracts. 22 When, at the end of the 19th century, the presence
of a public service became the criterion to decide in favor of the
administrative jurisdiction, the concept of contrat administratif
was enlarged to include also those contracts involving the per-
formance of a public service.23 Soon thereafter, however, the
Conseil d'Etat adopted an additional criterion: the administrative
nature of the contract could result also from its terms and condi-
tions, thus giving birth to the notion of the "exorbitant clause". 24
A not too unfair summary of the current state of the distinc-
tion could thus be the following: in addition to those contracts
expressly characterized as administrative by a statute, a contrat
administratif is one which either (i) includes clauses that show
that the Government wishes to exercise public law prerogatives
with respect to the contractor (the so called "exorbitant
clauses"); (ii) is subject to a special legal regime that grants to
the Government certain regulatory or control powers (the "exor-
bitant regime"); or (iii) either entrusts to the private contractor
the performance of a public service or is intricately linked with
the performance of a public service, so that it can be said that
the contract is a form of performance of the public service or
that the contractor cooperates in the performance of a public
service.25
Of course, these rules give rise to many queries. Which
clauses are to be considered "exorbitant?" Those unusual in pri-
vate law or those that would be illegal in private law?26 When is a
specific legal regime "exorbitant",27 and when is a contract intri-
22. DE LAuBADERE, supra n.21, at 126.
23. Terrier, Conseil d'Etat, Feb. 6, 1903, Lebon 94; Thtrond, Conseil d'Etat, Mar.
4, 1910, Lebon 193. This criterion was revitalized in 1956 in the decisions Epoux Bertin
& Ministre de l'Agriculture c. Consorts Grimouard, Conseil d'Etat, Apr. 20, 1956,
Lebon 167, 168.
24. The first case so holding was Socift6 des Granits Porphyroides des Vosges,
Conseil d'Etat, Jul. 31, 1912, Lebon 909.
25. 1 DE LAUBADERE, supra n.21, at 125-240; RICHER, supra n.21, at 84-123.
26. The following clauses have been considered "exorbitant": a grant to the Gov-
ernment of the right to modify the contract unilaterally or to direct the performance of
the contractor and the imposition on the contractor of obligations that benefit the
public. The Government's right to terminate has not always been considered "exorbi-
tant". See RICHER, supra n.21, at 88-90.
27. A 1955 decree regulating mandatory purchases of electricity by the State elec-
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cately linked with a public service? These are all issues which
have given rise to many precedents of the Conseil d'Etat and exer-
cised administrative law writers to the extent that an author de-
clares that court decisions on the subject are sometimes unfore-
seeable or surprising.28
But the complexity of the subject grows when it is realized
that a distinction that arose out of the mere need to allocate
controversies arising from Government contracts among the two
jurisdictional systems, ended up producing a substantive body of
law that governs the contrat administratif and which, in many cru-
cial aspects, deviates from the one applicable to purely private
agreements. Two main ideas are at the base of this special body
of law: the superior legal position of the Government vis-A-vis its
private counter-party, and the impossibility for the Government
of waiving its prerogatives. 9 Thus, for example, the Govern-
ment has the power to direct the performance of the contractor
and to unilaterally amend or terminate the contract for reasons
of public convenience, even if these rights are not spelled out in
the agreement."' On the other hand, the contractor has an im-
plied right to claim relief in the face of unforeseen circum-
stances which destroy the economic balance of the contract
under several doctrines, such as the theory of impr&ision, a right
that does not exist in private agreements when it is not expressly
provided."
Of course, those government powers are not untrammeled.
The power to terminate, when not expressly contemplated in the
agreement, requires the Government to grant full compensation
to the contractor, including loss of profits." It is therefore sel-
dom used in the case of concessions of public service where it
would be extremely costly.": The existence and scope of the
tricity company fr-om private generators, that granted the Ministerjurisdiction to decide
controversies arising thereunder, was deemed an "exorbitant regime." Socit6
d'exploitation 6lectrique de la Rivire di Sant, Conseil d'Etat Jan. 19, 1973, Lebon 48.
28. RICHER, supra n.21, at 88, 92.
29. Id. at 23; 2 nrE LAUHADPRE, supra n.21, 405, 734-35.
30. 2 )E LAUBADPRE, supra n.21 at 383-408, 658-71; RiCHnR, supra n.21, at 219-25,
231-35.
31. 2 DE LAUBADRE, supra n.21 at 569-630; RICHER, supra n.21, at 246-50.
32. 2 DE LXUBADPRE, supra n.21, at 668-71.
33. Id. at 737.
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power to amend has been the subject of debate. 4 Does it exist
at all? Does it include all contrats administratifs?15 What clauses
of the contract does it reach? The first two questions are now
considered to have been settled in the affirmative by the deci-
sion of the Conseil d'Etat in Union des transports.3" As to the last
question, the majority opinion is that the Government's power is
limited to amending the performance obligations of the contrac-
tor so that it complies at all times with the changing needs of
public service. It does not reach, therefore, the financial aspects
of the contract, without prejudice to the contractor's right to de-
mand additional compensation if the amended performance en-
tails costs in excess of those required by the performance origi-
nally contemplated by the agreement. 7 There is general accord
as well, that the power to amend the contract does not reach a
change of its nature, nor can it lead to a substantial alteration of
the economic rights of the parties (bouleversement du contrat)." s
While the existence of special rules for Government con-
tracts is common to many countries, the scope and depth of the
contrat administratif doctrine render the French legal system, as
well as those other systems that follow this doctrine, excep-
tional.3 9 Nevertheless, some French authors consider the dis-
tinction between the contrat administratif and the private law con-
tract artificial,' or believe that the differences between them
have been exaggerated.4' Others see a gradual approximation
of the two legal regimes, partly due to the impact of the Euro-
34. J. L'Huillier (Les contrats administratifs tienent-ils lieu de loi d l'administration? Dal-
loz 1953, Chroniques 87) rejected the existence of this power.
35. Gast6n Jze had argued that this power existed only in certain contracts (Le
regimej idique du contrat administratif 1945 Revue du Droit Public 251, at 257).
36. Union des transports publics urbains et regionaux, Conseil d'Etat, Feb. 2,
1983, Lebon 33. See discussion in DE LAUBADPRE, supra n.21, at 394-402; see also the note
ofJ.M. Auby in RtVUE DE DROIT PUBLC 212 (1984).
37. 2 DE LAUBADtRE, supra n.21, at 406-07. See also GEORGE DuPuIs ET AL., DROrr
ADMINISTRATIF 407 (6th ed. 1999).
38. 2 DE LAUBADERE, supra n.21, at 407.
39. In addition to Latin America, these include Belgium, Spain and French-speak-
ing African Nations. See RICHER, supra n.21, at 28-32; see also UWE LoTHJE, LA TECH-
NIQUE JURIDIQUE DU CONTRAT ADMINISTRATIF EN DROIT COMPARE (1963); Georges Lan-
grod, Administrative Contracts, 4 Am.J. COMP. L. 325 (1955); and the chapter on Public
Contracts written by Colin C. Turpin in VII INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARA-
TIVE Lxw.
40. CHARLES DEBBASCH, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 531 (6th ed. 2002).
41. Thus, for the public works contract, FRANC.OIS LLORENS, CONTRAT D'ENrERPRISE
ET MARCHE DES TRAVAUX PUBLIc-S 651-68 (1981).
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pean Community legislation which does not recognize the dis-
tinction between contrats administratifs and Government con-
tracts subject to private law.4 2 Another attack on the specificity
of the contrat administratif may yet come from the adoption in
France of mechanisms to provide private finance structures for
public projects, since the traditional rules of the contrat adminis-
tratif might hamper their implementation according to some
views.43 Finally, a foreign observer may ask whether the correla-
tion between the jurisdictional and the substantive aspects of the
doctrine will be affected by a recent French statute declaring
that controversies arising under certain contracts with the Gov-
ernment, including some that had always been considered pri-
vate law agreements, such as insurance contracts, will be herein-
after subject to the administrative jurisdiction.44
III. THE RECEPTION OF THE CONTRAT ADMINISTRATIF
IN ARGENTINA
Argentina is a federal country and has a Constitution that
follows the U.S. model of separation of powers.4 Its judicial
branch, like its U.S. counterpart, possesses the power to inter-
pret the constitutionality of the laws and the constitutionality
and legality of the Government's conduct.4" Administrative
courts have therefore been considered incompatible with this
system to the extent that their decisions are not themselves sub-
ject to judicial review.47 Thus, while the decisions of the French
Conseil d'Etat and other administrative tribunals are not subject
to review by any French judicial court, those of the few adminis-
trative courts that exist in Argentina, such as the federal Tax and
Admiralty Courts, as well as all other administrative decisions,
42. RICHER, supra n.21, at 32-34.
43. Such were the conclusions of some, but not all of the speakers at a recent SMi
seminar on "PPP and Concessions in France" held in Paris on February 24-25, 2003.
44. Law No. 2002-1168 of Dec. 11, 2001,J.O. Dec. 12, 2001, 19703. It declared all
"marches," or contracts for the supply of goods, services, or works, executed under the
Code des Marchds Publics to have the nature of contrats administratifs. See RICHER, supra
n.21, at 108.
45. The federal Constitution was adopted in 1853 and amended in 1860, 1866,
1898, 1957 and 1994. The current text is published in [LIV-C] A.D.L.A. 2731.
46. "Rfos, G6mez y Rfos," CSJN, [1863] 1 Fallos 32; "Tomkinson," CSJN [1864] 1
Fallos 62.
47. SeeJORGE T. Boscu, TRIBUNALESJUDI(CALES o TRIBUNALES ADMINISTRATIVOS PARA
JUZGAR A LA ADMINISTACION PUBLICA (1951) (attacking the constitutionality of adminis-
trative courts in Argentina).
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can be appealed to the judicial courts.4 8
Apart from constitutional law, other branches of law in Ar-
gentina have been influenced by French law, especially the Civil
Code enacted in 1869 and based to a great extent on the Napo-
leonic Code. This happened also with administrative law, in
spite of its close relation to constitutional law, because until the
middle of the 20th century, U.S. administrative law was not fully
developed while, in this field, French law was deemed to be the
most advanced in the world. Therefore, the incompatibilities of
many of the doctrines of French administrative law with the rules
of a Constitution based on the U.S. model, were glossed over or
minimized. The existence of a separate system of administrative
courts was mimicked by the creation in 1947 of a separate
branch of the federal judiciary, entrusted with matters involving
administrative law,49 albeit subject to the paramount position of
the Argentine Supreme Court with jurisdiction over all federal
courts.
In Argentina, therefore, the constitutional reasons present
in France for distinguishing between Government controversies
subject to public or to private law for purposes of allocating
them to the appropriate jurisdiction do not exist. Nevertheless,
even before the creation of the administrative law branch of the
federal courts, the doctrine of the contrat administratif was fol-
lowed by administrative law writers. French authors on the sub-
ject were widely quoted. Thus, Gaston J~ze's work on the gen-
eral theory of the Government contracts"0 was the basis for a set
of rules governing the concession of public service proposed by
48. "Fernindez Arias c. Poggio," CSJN, [1960] 247 Fallos 646 (holding thatjudicial
review of administrative courts' decisions is constitutionally required). Tax Court deci-
sions are reviewable by the Federal Court of Appeals pursuant to of Law No. 11683, as
amended, July 13, 1998, [LVIII-C] A.D.L.A. 2969, Secs. 86, 192; those of the Admiralty
Court are reviewable pursuant to Law No. 18870, Dec. 17, 1970, [XXXI-A] A.D.L.A. 9,
Secs. 86 and 90.
49. Law No. 12967, Apr. 12, 1947, [VII] A.D.L.A. 248; Law No. 13278, Oct. 1, 1948,
[VIII] A.D.L.A. 187. These courts are now called "tribunales en lo contencioso-administra-
tivo federal." Their competence is regulated by Law No. 13998, Oct. 11, 1950, [X-A]
A.D.L.A. 221, Sec. 45; Decree-law No. 1285/1958, Feb. 4, 1958, [XVIII-A] A.D.L.A. 587,
Sec. 42; Law No. 21628, Aug. 26, 1977, [XXXVII-D] A.D.L.A. 3671, Sec. 4.
50. THkORIE G9N9RALE DES CONTRATS DE L'ADMINISTRATION (1934-1936). A Span-
ish translation of the six-volume treatise of which the aforementioned work formed the
three last volumes, was published in Buenos Aires in 1948-1950.
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a national convention of lawyers held in 1936.' An influential
book especially dedicated to the subject of the administrative
contracts was published in 1952.52 The matter has been dealt
with in most administrative law treatises, the most authoritative
one being that of Miguel S. Marienhoff.5" It has, in turn, given
rise to many law journal articles and court precedents. 54
With the zeal of disciples, both the original scope of the
doctrine of the contrat administratif and its consequences, have
been expanded by the Argentine commentators. One reason for
this expansion has been the efforts of the federal Supreme
Court to reduce its original jurisdiction in contractual controver-
sies involving the different provinces (or states) of Argentina.
From a comparative law point of view, this is an interesting devel-
opment, arising from the interplay of a rule taken from the origi-
nal text of the U.S. Constitution with a French legal doctrine.
The initial text of the U.S. Constitution allocated controver-
sies between a state and a citizen of another state, to the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court."5 According to the first laws
on federal jurisdiction, this rule applied only to "civil" cases,5 6 a
term later used by the Supreme Court to distinguish such cases
from penal ones.57 However, when in 1794 the Supreme Court
decided against the state of Georgia in a case brought under this
rule, Georgia, in response, passed a statute punishing with hang-
ing "without benefit of clergy" anyone who attempted to enforce
that Supreme Court decision.58 Soon after, the Constitution was
amended and the rule was changed.' l
51. See the proposal of the 4th National Convention of Lawyers in 61 J.A.-Doctrina-
90 (1938).
52. MIGUEtl A. BFR(ArZ, TEORIA GENERAL DE LOS CONTRATOs ADMINISTRATIVOS (2d
ed. 1980).
53. 3-A TRATADO DE DERECFIO AI)MINISTRATIVO (3d ed. 1982-1983). See (Lo RAFAEL
BIELSA, 2 DERECHO ADMINISTRAriVO 142-53 (5th ed. 1955); MANUEL M. DIEZ, 2 DERECHO
ADMINISTRArIVO 435-59 (1965).
54. A review of the Supreme Court decision on the subject can be found in Pedro
.I.J. Coviello, El Criterio de Contrato Administrativo en la.lurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Naci6n, 111 E.D. 845 (1985).
55. U.S. CONsr. art. III, Sec. 2, cls. 1, 2.
56. The Judiciary Act of 1789, Sec. 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80-81.
57. See CHARLES A. 'WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs 766 (4th ed. 1983) (citing Wisconsin
v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888)).
58. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1794). See ERWIN CURMERINSm', FEDERALJU-
RISDICTION 330 (1989).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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The Argentine Constitution of 1853 copied in this respect
the original text of the U.S. Constitution.6 Although the 1853
Constitution was subject to several amendments, this jurisdic-
tional rule remains today as originally drafted. The early laws
that organized the Argentine federal court system also copied
the U.S. statutes on the subject, restricting the original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court in controversies involving a province
of Argentina with citizens of another province to "civil" cases.6 '
As these controversies multiplied during the 20th century, there
was a danger that the Supreme Court would become swamped
with the contractual litigation of the provinces tried by it under
its original jurisdiction. The Court then began interpreting
"civil" not in opposition to penal, as was the construction given
in the United States, but in opposition to "administrative. "62
Therefore, by labeling a provincial contract as "administrative",
the Argentine Supreme Court has been able, effectively, to re-
fuse to hear many of the contractual controversies involving a
province and citizens of a different province. Given the inappro-
priateness of said constitutional rule in today's litigious world,
the construction can be defended as protecting the Supreme
Court from an overcharged docket. However, an indirect result
has been the expansion of the concept of the "administrative
contract," as the Court has adopted a very broad definition of it
- one, which, as will be seen, can encompass almost any con-
tract executed by a governmental agency. Traditional legal rea-
soning in Argentina would refuse to accept a jurisdictional con-
cept for the administrative contract and a different concept for
substantive law purposes. Thus, the understandable effort of the
Supreme Court to manage its docket rationally has had the indi-
rect consequence of expanding greatly the scope of the adminis-
trative contract doctrine without providing much guidance as to
its substantive regime, as reported cases dealing with jurisdic-
tional issues do not always require a decision on the merits.6"
60. CONST. ARG. art. 117.
61. Law Decree-Law No. 1285/1958, Feb. 4, 1958, [XVIII-A] A.D.L.A. 587, Sec. 24.
62. "Provincia de Buenos Aires c. S.A. Frigorffico Anglo," CSJN [1947] 209 Fallos
514; "Provincia de Corrientes c. S.R.L. Capri," CSJN [1975] 293 Fallos 412; "S.A. Las
Petaquitas A.C.e I. v. Provincia de Buenos Aires," CSJN [1976] 296 Fallos 34; "Contipel
Catamarca," CSJN [1988] 311 Fallos 2065.
63. See, e.g., "Lindoro I.C.S.A.," CSJN [1984] 306 Fallos 328; "Inforex," CSJN
[1984] 306 Fallos 762.
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IV. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONTRA CT DOCTRINE IN ARGENTINA
A. The Definition of the Administrative Contract
A contract executed by a governmental agency is to be con-
sidered administrative, pursuant to the definition adopted by the
Supreme Court, when the performance of the private contractor
fulfills a "public purpose," such as rendering services used for
the carrying out of the telecommunications public service.6 4
Definitions offered by administrative law scholars are equally
broad: the satisfaction of a public need, a direct and immediate
relation with "specific" State functions (i.e., those considered of
a truly public nature), the involvement of an administrative func-
tion, the presence of a public interest, are all factors that have
been considered sufficient to impart an administrative nature to
a Government contract.6 5
In addition to this definition of the administrative contract
by reason of its object, Argentine law has also adopted the
French concepts of the exorbitant clause6" and the exorbitant
regime."7 Thus, a clause allowing the State railway company to
require the withdrawal of advertisements on billboards placed
within its premises when they violate ethical, aesthetic, or safety
reasons, has been considered "exorbitant" and sufficient to de-
termine the administrative nature of the contract."8 An exorbi-
tant regime has been found in a rental of space in an airport, as
it was subject to laws granting the Government special eviction
rights." Pursuant to an opinion of the federal Attorney Gen-
eral, even a legal regime enacted after the execution of the con-
tract may be sufficient to characterize a contract as "administra-
64. "Cinplast," CSIN, [1993] 316 Fallos 212. See also "Organizaci6n Coordinadora
Argentina," CSJN [1996-E] L.L. 76.
65. See BERCAITZ, supra n.52, at 246-247; 2 BIELSA, supra n.53, at 142-53; 3-A
MARIENHOFF, supra n.53, at 56-57; Juan Carlos Cassagne, La sustantividad del Contrato
Administrativo y sus principales consecuenciasjuridicas, 15-16 REVISTA DE DERECHO ADMINIS-
TRATIVO 143 (1994); HtCTOR EscoLA, 1 TRATADO INTEGRAL DE LOS CONTRATOS ADMINIS-
TRATIVOS 127-31 (1977).
66. See Lindoro; Inforex, supra n.63.
67. "Lopez," CSJN [1984] 306 Fallos 731; "Fernando Horacio Serra," CSJN [1993]
316 Fallos 2454 (1993); "Yacimientos Petrolfferos Fiscales S.A. c. Construcciones Sad-
demi S.A.," CSJN [1993] 316 Fallos 2771.
68. "Clan SACIFI," CSJN [1989] 312 Fallos 696, 700.
69. L6pez, supra n.67.
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tive" for jurisdictional purposes. 7°1 Thus, a contract born as a pri-
vate agreement could see its nature change midstream into an
administrative one by fiat of the Government.
As an observer can readily see, it is difficult to imagine a
Government contract that, directly or indirectly, does not fulfill
a public purpose, be it merely the replenishing of the Treasury's
coffers in a sale of Government property contracted under pri-
vate law rules. The definitions are also subjective in nature, as
they depend on the narrow or broad role of the State preferred
by the interpreter: what is a truly public function when for sev-
eral decades during the 20th century the Argentine Government
operated most of the utilities, the railroads and the main local
airline? The concepts of exorbitant clause and exorbitant re-
gime are not any clearer in Argentina than in France, as the dis-
cussion is punctuated with citations of French authors.71 The
net result is that it is difficult to affirm that any given Govern-
ment contract is not of an administrative character. As a com-
parative law scholar says, "[S] uch fictitious splitting of the nature
of administrative activity is considered a mere myth, as it does
not cover the fact that this activity always seeks the public wel-
fare. "72
The problem is not so serious with respect to those con-
tracts that have been traditionally considered "administrative" by
reason of their object or purpose. These include the construc-
tion of public works, the supply of goods or services to the Gov-
ernment, the contract of public employment, the concession to
operate a public service, the concession to use public lands and
the concession to build and exploit a public work (for example,
a toll road). Private contractors or persons entering into these
agreements know beforehand that they will be subject to admin-
istrative law, and either a specific law, such as the Public Works
Law,73 government regulations, 4 or, normally, the contractual
documents themselves, set out in some detail the powers of the
70. Contipel Catamarca, supra n.62.
71. See, e.g., 3-A MARIENrHOFF, supra n.53, at 74-80.
72. LANGROD, supra n.39, at 328.
73. Law No. 13064, Oct. 13, 1947, [VIII A.D.L.A. 404, as amended.
74. Decree No. 436, June 5, 2000, [LX-C] A.D.L.A. 2869 (governing contracts for
the supply of goods to the federal Government); Law No. 25164, June 10, 1999, [LIX-E]
A.D.L.A. 5252 (governing public employment with the federal Government).
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Government and the countervailing rights of the private contrac-
tor.
The problem is more serious, instead, with those other con-
tracts that are defined as "administrative" by the government law-
yers or by a court only after they have been executed, to the
surprise of the private counter-party. That such surprises may
arise can be seen from a list of the agreements that have been
classified as "administrative contracts" by the courts or by differ-
ent authorities. They include a deposit in a provincial State
bank,71 the distribution of Government mail by a private cou-
rier,7  a contract for the exploitation of billboard space for com-
mercial advertising, 77 the sale by the Government of low-cost
housing,78 Government loans, 79 the production of programs for
a State TV channel,"' oil concessions,"' and leases of private real
estate to house State agencies."
A recent regulation, issued by the federal Executive under
powers delegated by Congress, has expanded the concept of the
administrative contract by providing that all Government con-
tracts are presumed to be administrative unless it is otherwise
stipulated or it results otherwise from the dossier."3 The concept
of administrative contract, therefore, tends more and more to
equate that of the Government contract, a position that has been
argued by certain Argentine scholars: all Government contracts
would thus be administrative contracts.8 4 Some recent Supreme
Court decisions could be construed as adopting this position.'
75. "Virginia Clara Aquino," CSJN [1991] 314 Fallos 810.
76. Organizacidn Coordinadora Argentina, supra n.64.
77. Clan SACIFI, supra n.68.
78. "Acosta," CNFed [1989-B] L.L 295.
79. Contipel Catamarca, stupra n.62.
80. "Radiodifusora Buenos Aires," CSJN [ 1993] 316 Fallos 225, 233 (Cavagna, Mar-
tinez and Barra, I]., dissenting).
81. H. Daniel Casal, Marco juridico de los contratos petroleros segiin el plan Houston,
[1989-D] L.L. 1237, 1240.
82. 3-A MARIENHOFF, supra n.53, at 120-21.
83. Decree No. 1023, Aug. 16, 2001, [LXI-D] A.D.L.A. 4144, Sec. 1.
84. RODOLFO BARRA, I CONTRATO D)E OBRA POBI.I(A 37-47 (1984).
85. "Ingenierfa Omega," CSJN [2000] 323 Fallos 3924. The Supreme Court stated
that the validity of administrative contracts depends on the fulfillment of formal and
procedural requirements provided by applicable law, a statement which is true of all
Government contracts, whether administrative or not, since the rules on competitive
bidding do not distinguish between the two kinds of contracts.
2003] GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS UNDER ARGENTINE LAW1733
B. The Jurisdictional Rules Applicable to Administrative Contracts
Controversies arising with respect to an administrative con-
tract entered into with the federal Government fall under the
jurisdiction of the federal courts with competence in administra-
tive matters.8 6 When such a contract has been entered into with
a provincial State agency, provincial laws either require that the
case be brought before the provincial Supreme Court (the tradi-
tional rule)87 or before a special branch of the judicial courts
with competence in administrative matters (the new rule en-
acted in some of the major provinces given the increase of this
type of litigation).88 In all cases, therefore, the judicial courts
have competence to decide contract cases involving the Govern-
ment and other public agencies. At the federal level (but not in
some provinces according to their constitutions), 9 the existence
of a separate branch of courts to rule on administrative law mat-
ters is not a constitutional requirement, as it in France, so a law
could unify all the contractual litigation of the Government and
thus, do away with the jurisdictional basis of the distinction.
In cases of doubt, pragmatism induces the private party to
bring the lawsuit before the courts with administrative compe-
tence (or the relevant provincial court, if applicable), unless the
favorable decision of the case would depend on the contract not
being defined as "administrative". Practice has shown that Gov-
ernment lawyers seldom oppose the jurisdiction of the courts
with administrative competence, while they generally challenge
that of the ordinary courts, except in the clearest of cases. Such
a challenge entails not only a delay until resolved (and as the
matter may go up to the federal Supreme Court in cases involv-
ing the federal Government, this delay can be long), but may
also force the private party losing the competence issue to pay
86. Lindoro, supra n.63; 'Jorge Papadopulos," CSJN [1984] 306 Fallos 333; L6pez,
supra n.67; Inforex, supra n.63; "Talleres Carmona," CSJN [1984] 306 Fallos 856;
"E.N.Tel c. Cia. de Seguros del Interior," CSJN [1986] 308 Fallos 229.
87. The province of Mendoza employs such a traditional rule. See Prov. Law No.
3918, Aug. 9, 1973, [XXXIII-D] A.D.L.A. 4361, Sec. 1.
88. The province of C6rdoba employs the new rule. See Prov. Law No. 7182, Nov.
21, 1984, [XL1V-D] A.D.L.A. 4405, amended by Prov. Law 7818, Dec. 11, 1989 [L-A]
A.D.L.A. 749, Sec. 5. For the province of Santa Fe, see Prov. Law No. 11330, Dec. 26,
1995 [LVI-B] A.D.L.A. 3253, Sec. 2.
89. Sec. 166 of the 1994 Constitution of the province of Buenos Aires requires the
existence of a special division of courts with competence in administrative matters.
Aug. 22, 1994 [LIV-D] A.D.L.A. 5120.
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legal costs to the Government lawyers. Thus, the practical ad-
vantages of choosing the courts with administrative competence
are clear. This attitude strengthens, in the long run, the trend
towards the expansion of the concept of "administrative con-
tract," as more and more Government contract cases are tried by
the federal courts with administrative competence and indexed
in the law reports under that title.
C. The Substantive Regime of the Administrative Contract:
the Government Powers
Defining a Government contract as administrative implies
that it is subject to administrative law and thus, that the rights of
the private contractor are in a "relation of subordination" vis-A-
vis those of the Administration, whose prerogatives are consid-
ered "powers" and not mere "rights" since they cannot be waived
by it."' It follows, therefore, that private law rules (the Civil and
the Commercial Codes) will not necessarily apply to the contract
which means, essentially, that the Civil Code rule according to
which a contract binds the parties thereto as a law,"1 generally
does not apply against the Government.92 However, this does
not result, in many cases, in the contract being subject to a clear
and precise body of law. There is no general law on Government
contracts with specific rules for each type of contract. Public
works contracts have a special law that sets a limit to the Govern-
ment's right to amend the contract unilaterally, and provides for
the consequences of most cases of termination.9 Supply agree-
ments are governed by administrative regulations which provide
similar rules. 4 Consulting agreements with the Government are
90. "Meridiano," CSJN [1979] 301 Fallos 292, 303. See also 3-A MARIENHOFF, supra
n.53, at 398.
91. COD. CIv. Sec. 1197.
92. Several decisions, however, declare this rule applicable to the private contrac-
tor. See "Intecar," CSJN [1979] 301 Fallos 525; 'Jos6 Antonio Montes," CSJN [1992]
Fallos 315-1760; "Sideco," SCNFed. [1996-D] L.L. 122. Cf. "Marocco y Cfa," CSJN
[1989] 312 Fallos 84 (1989) (declaring it applicable to the Governmental party).
93. Law No. 13064, Sec. 53 allows the contractor to terminate if the amendment
exceeds twenty percent of the total value of the contract. Secs. 51 and 54, respectively,
regulate the consequences of termination by the Administration and by the contractor.
Public works concessions are governed by Law No. 17520, Nov. 13, 1967, [XXVII-C]
A.D.L.A. 2813.
94. Decree No. 436, supra n.74, Annex, Sec. 99 allows increases of up to twenty
percent, and reductions of up to ten percent of the original amount of the contract.
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also subject to a special law. Concessions to operate public util-
ities have no general law governing them,96 but the relevant
agreements normally spell out the powers of the Government to
amend the obligations of the concessionaire and to terminate
the contract. Other Government contracts, however, that lack
such ground rules would still be subject, under the administra-
tive contract doctrine, to the powers of the governmental party
to amend or terminate the contract unilaterally for reasons of
public convenience, even when the agreement does not include
them. These powers are considered derived from the adminis-
trative nature of the contract and are thus deemed incorporated
as implied exorbitant clauses, even when not spelled out in the
contractual documents. 7  In such "other" Government con-
tracts, the extent of the power of amendment is vague, as the
authors can only say that it should be applied taking into ac-
count the circumstances of each contract."'s The Supreme Court
has held that the Government cannot waive these prerogatives
by contract."
The net result of imprecision in both the definition of the
"administrative contract", and in the substantive regime to which
it is subject, is that except to a certain extent in the aforemen-
tioned contracts traditionally considered as "administrative", the
private party to a Government contract cannot know with preci-
sion which are its rights and obligations, and whether it will be
required to obey the changes introduced by the Government
and to suffer the termination of its agreement if so decided by
the Government by reasons of public interest.
An additional problem that results from the characteriza-
tion of a given Government contract as "administrative," is that
all, or at least the most significant, of the Government's deci-
sions taken along the life of the contract, are considered "admin-
istrative acts."' ° As such, pursuant to the federal Administrative
95. Law No. 22460, Mar. 27, 1981, [XLI-B] A.D.L.A. 1688, Sec. 18 allows the Gov-
ernment to introduce amendments up to twenty percent of the value of the contract.
96. A draft of a law on concessions and licenses was prepared by a Commission
appointed by the Ministry of Justice in 1998, but was never enacted. See 246 Revista
Argentina del Regimen de la Administraci6n PHiblica 133 (1999).
97. 3-A MARIENHOFF, supra n.53, at 395, 403.
98. Id. at 398.
99. Meridiano, supra n.90.
100. PedroJ.J. Coviello, La teorfa general del contrato administrativo a travis de lajuris-
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Procedure Law ("APL"),"' they enjoy a presumption of validity,
demand immediate compliance, and become firm and not sub-
ject to judicial review if unchallenged within a short time (nor-
mally fifteen business days) by means of an administrative ap-
peal. 12 Furthermore, if this challenge is rejected by the Admin-
istration, the rejection must itself be submitted for judicial
review within ninety business days, or the same legal conse-
quence would follow."" According to case law, lack of a timely
challenge to a Government decision also defeats the contractor's
claim for damages caused by such decision. 104
Such a regime affects the right of the contractor to obtain
judicial review of the Government's decisions in several ways.
First, the contractor may have assumed mistakenly that the con-
tract was not "administrative," and therefore, it may have not
pursued its administrative and judicial remedies in the short pe-
riods described above, treating its controversy with the Govern-
ment as a private contractual matter, subject to the normal stat-
ute of limitations periods. In this case, the claim of the contrac-
tor will be met with the arguments of Government's counsel to
the effect that the conduct of the Government under the agree-
ment must be considered valid for lack of timely challenge, so
that no damages or other additional compensation should be
awarded to the contractor. Second, even if the private party as-
sumed from the start the administrative nature of the contract,
not many contractors wish to antagonize their governmental
counter-party by bringing against it several lawsuits during the
life of the agreement, or to incur the substantial cost involved in
such litigation, preferring instead to attempt a negotiated solu-
prudencia de Ia Cmie Suprema deJusticia de la Naci6n, in 130 ANOS DE LA PROCURACION DEL
TESORO DE 1,% NACION 1863-1993 98, 120-25 (1994).
101. Decree-law No. 19549, Apr. 3, 1972, [XXXII-B] A.D.L.A. 1752, as amended
[hereinafter APL]. The restated text of its implementing regulation was approved by
Decree No. 1883, Sept. 17, 1991, [LI-D] A.D.L.A. 3946 [hereinafter Implementing Reg-
ulation].
102. APL, supra n.101, Secs. 12, 23; Implementing Regulation, supra n.101, Sec.
90. In France, the rule that recognizes exceptions is that the validity of administrative
decisions issued during the life of a contract cannot be challenged by the contractor,
but may open a claim for an indemnity. 2 DE LAUBAIDRE 1001, 1003-07, 1056-61.
103. APL, supra n.101, Sec. 25. The application of this rule to administrative deci-
sions taken in the course of a contract's performance was first rejected by the Supreme
Court in "Mevopal," CSJN [1985] 307 Fallos 2216, but was subsequently admitted in
"Gypobras," CSJN [1995] 318 Fallos 441.
104. "Petracca," CNFed. [1986-D] L.L. 10.
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tion. And finally, the need to comply with all the orders im-
parted by the Government during the life of the contract, until
set aside in a lengthy judicial review process, can well put the
contractor into bankruptcy, except in the rare cases where a
court injunction suspending the implementation of the order is
obtained at the outset.
0 5
Refusal to apply Civil Code rules results also in the limited
scope recognized in the exceptio non adimpleti contractus in admin-
istrative contracts. This defense, originating in Roman law and
now based on Section 1201 of the Civil Code, prevents a party in
default from demanding performance by the other party to the
contract. The mere existence of this defense in favor of the pri-
vate contractor is disputed in administrative contracts and even
if admitted, according to the prevailing view, the defense cannot
be invoked unless the Government's default makes it impossible
for the contractor to comply with its own obligations.1 "" This is a
strict but also imprecise test for the private contractor to meet.
An incorrect pleading of the defense would make the contractor
who suspends performance in the meantime, liable to be ad-
judged in default. In these times of generalized default of its
obligations by the Argentine Government, it is not surprising
that many Government contracts end before completion with re-
ciprocal allegations of default, which the courts have then to sort
out.
All these problems have been aggravated by the recent regu-
lation cited above, that has significantly strengthened the Gov-
ernment powers in its contracts.' 7 Thus, the power to amend
exists now in all administrative contracts and with respect to all
clauses, provided it is exercised "reasonably," with the only quan-
titative limit that if it affects the amount of the contractor's per-
formance, it cannot exceed twenty percent of the originally
agreed amount.'" The power of unilateral termination by the
Government for reasons of public convenience is also recog-
nized in all administrative contracts, while loss of profits is ex-
105. For an exceptional case where such suspension was allowed, see "Tienda
Le6n," CNFed., [1996-D] L.L. 127.
106. See 3-A MARIENHOFF, supra n.53, at 376-85; see also Cinplast, supra n.64, at 217.
In France, in a contrat administratif, the private party cannot oppose this defense.
107. Decree No. 1023, supra n.83, Sec. 12.
108. Id.
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pressly denied to the contractor in such cases.'"" Finally, the
rules of the APL on administrative acts, which empower the Ad-
ministration to revoke or amend administrative acts unilaterally
for reasons of public convenience, albeit with the right of com-
pensation in favor of the private party, have been made directly
applicable to Government contracts."" If any doubts still re-
mained as to the extent of the Government's powers, they have
now been definitively quashed in favor of the Government.
D. The Substantive Regime of the Administrative Contract:
the Countervailing Rights of the Contractor
The above description would be unfair if an important right
of the contractor that, in effect, countervails the Government's
prerogatives, is not mentioned. This is the right to maintain
what is known as the "economic equation" of the contract, i.e., a
balance between the cost of the performance required from the
contractor, and the benefits it receives from the agreement.'''
This balance can be altered by several causes, all of which
give rise to this right of the contractor, although under different
theories mostly taken from French law. The first cause com-
prises the changes in the specific contract introduced by the ex-
ercise of the Government's right to amend the agreement unilat-
erally: the compensation due to the contractor simply protects
what in loose terms may be called the "mutuality of the agree-
ment."' 12 The second, is the effect on the contract of general
Government measures that have a significant and prejudicial ef-
fect on the economy of the contract: the fait du prince of French
administrative law. 1 3 Another cause is the impact on the con-
tract of unforeseeable economic changes that disrupt the con-
tract and subject the private party to a significant loss, such as a
sudden major devaluation. We are here in the field of the thgorie
de la imprvision.' " Finally, the contractor may face unforeseen
109. Id.
110. Id. Sec. 36; see APL, supra n.101, Sec. 18, on the Government's power to
amend or revoke an administrative act for reasons of convenience.
111. See 3-A MARIP Ni-OFF, sufra n.53, at 469-73.
112. Id. at 475-76.
113. Id. at 476-500. For the discussion of French law, see 2 DE LAuIAI)ERE, supra
n.21, at 515-58. No comparison is offered in this paper with the U.S. sovereign acts
doctrine. For discussion of this particular topic, see NASH & CIBINIC, supra n.2, at 365-73.
114. 3-A MARIENHOFF, supra n.53, at 500-48. For the discussion of French law, see 2
Dt ILAUBAD'RP, supra n.21, at 559-630. Since a 1968 amendment of Sec. 1198 of the
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obstacles in its performance, such as unexpected sub-soil condi-
tions. These are the "unforeseen physical difficulties" (sujdtions
imprvues in French law) that also entitle the contractor to an
increase in compensation, when they exceed a certain thresh-
old.1 15 The precise conditions for the application of these theo-
ries, as well as the consequences of their successful pleadings,
have produced abundant literature and precedents in France as
well as in Argentina, which exceed the scope of this Article.
V. A COMPARISON WI7H OTHER SYSTEMS
Given the French origin of the doctrine, it may be relevant
to inquire how far Argentine law could be said to have deviated
from it. Additionally, some tentative comparisons with the U.S.
legal regime for federal Government contracts will be offered.
A. Administrative Contract and Contrat Administratif
The Argentine regime of the administrative contract can be
said to go far beyond its French source, not only in the breadth
of the doctrine, but also in the substantive rules derived from it.
The concept of administrative contract that results from the
definitions applied by the Argentine courts or proposed by its
authors is broader than the French notion of the contrat adminis-
tratif Given the imprecision inherent both in the concept of
public service' and in the link that it must exhibit with the con-
tract to characterize the latter as administratif, it is sterile to argue
whether the formulas used in Argentine law for such purpose
are more or less precise than the French parameters. However,
these formulas do allow an expansion of the concept beyond the
scope of the French doctrine, as can be seen in the example of a
lease of a private property to house a State agency, which in
France is the typical case of a Government contract subject to
the French Civil Code, while in Argentina would be considered
an administrative contract by the leading author on the sub-
Civil Code, parties to private contracts in Argentina can also invoke a similar theory,
thus eliminating, or at least attenuating significantly, the difference between the legal
regimes of administrative and private contracts, that in France remains noticeable.
115. 3 BARRA, CONTRATODE OBRA POBLICA 1178-82 (1988). For the discussion of
French law, see 2 DR LAUIRADERE, supra n.21, at 499-513.
116. The service public is, simultaneously, one of the most important and one of the
most controversial concepts of French administrative law. Dupuis et al., supra n.37, at
477.
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ject.' 17 The presumption of a Government contract being ad-
ministrative contained in the recent Argentine regulation on
Government contracts' '8 is opposite to the one that would apply
in France, according to some authors.'"'
The Argentine doctrine on the power of unilateral amend-
ment is also broader than the French rules on the contral ad-
ministratif This is true with respect to the scope of this power,
given that the Argentine courts have admitted that it could reach
any clause of the contract, 12 a rule that is now expressly pro-
vided by the recent regulation on Government contracts.121
Meanwhile in France, the changes that the Government may in-
troduce in the agreement can only affect the performance of the
contractor and only to the extent necessary to cater to the new
needs of the public service."'2 It may be queried whether the
same conclusion is not true as well with respect to the founda-
tion of this power. This is because the leading French treatise
on the subject includes language stating that the power to
amend the contract must be based on norms, whether constitu-
tional, statutory or regulatory, empowering the Administration
to act in order to protect the public interest. Contrary to what is
held in Argentina, de Laubadere argues that the mere fact that
the Administration has executed a contract, is not sufficient to
create such power.' One may thus wonder whether in France
the contract is administrative because the Government has the
power to amend it unilaterally (the "exorbitant regime"), while
in Argentina the Government has the power of unilateral
amendment because the contract is considered to be an adminis-
trative one. Given the already mentioned vague definitions of
this concept, the legal uncertainty resulting from the Argentine
doctrine is significant.
Finally, as indicated above, in France, unilateral termination
for reasons of public interest entitles the private contractor to be
117. Compare 3-A MARIENIHOF, supre/a n.53, at 120-21, with I DE L AUBAI)DERE, supra
n.21, at 341-42; see aLvo Ricvi ER, supra n.21, at 87.
118. Decree 1023, supra n.83, Sec. 1.
119. GEORGES VEDEL & PIERRE Dt-ivoi.vE, DROn- AI)MINISTRATIF 392-93 (12th ed.
1992).
120. Mevopal, supra n. 103.
121. Decree 1023, supra n.83, Sec. 12.
122. See supra n.37 and accompanying text.
123. Compare 2 DlE L\UBADF'RF, supra n.21, at 390-92, with 3-A MARIFNIHOFF, sura
n.53, at 395-403.
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compensated also for loss of profits, when that power had not
been expressly provided in the agreement. 24 This rule is ex-
pressly rejected by the recent Argentine regulation. 125
B. Administrative Contracts and U.S. Government Contracts
In spite of the apparent similarities mentioned above, 12" the
differences between the doctrine of the administrative contract
and the U.S. legal regime for Government contracts appear to
be stark. There is, first, a very different general emphasis. In-
stead of language on the contractor being subordinated to the
Government, an Argentine observer is surprised to find in U.S.
Government's contract law repeated statements on the general
applicability of the same basic principles that govern contracts
executed among private parties: "When the United States be-
comes a party to a commercial transaction, it incurs all the re-
sponsibilities of a private person under the same circumstances
... The Government's contractual liability must be decided in
the same manner as that of a private party in the same circum-
stances". 127 Even allowing for the special rules already men-
tioned, as the U.S. Supreme Court has said: "the United States
does business on business terms". 128
The second main difference is the restricted scope of any
governmental implied rights, given that for a Government right
to exist, the inclusion of the appropriate clause provided by the
FAR is needed. Even with respect to those clauses considered by
the courts to express a fundamental or significant procurement
policy and thus read into the contract when not clearly and le-
gally excluded, 21- the text is the one that was written in the regu-
lations as they existed when the contract was executed, regard-
124. See 2 DE LAUBADERE, supra n.21, at 667-71.
125. See Decree 1023, supra n.83, Sec. 12.
126. See supra n.14-17 and accompanying text.
127. MASSENGALE, supra n.2, at 8 (citing Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389 (1875)
and Krupp v. Federal Housing Administration, 285 F. 2d 833 (1st Cir. 1961)). See also
MiTrC-IE Lt, supra n.8, at 144-45 (citing Lynch v. U.S., 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) ("When
the United States enters into contractual relations its rights and duties therein are gov-
erned generally by law applicable to contracts between private individuals")).
128. United States v. National Exchange Bank, 270 U.S. 527, 534 (1926).
129. See NASH & CIUNIC, supra n.2, at 77-79. See also G.L. Christian & Assoc. v. U.S.,
160 Ct. Cl. 1, 312 F.2d 412, motion for rehearing and reargument denied 375 U.S. 954
(1963), rehearing denied 376 U.S. 929 (1964), motion for leave to file second petition for rehear-
ingdenied 377 U.S. 1010 (1964), 170 Ct. C1. 902 (1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 821 (1965).
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less of any subsequent changes to its text."" ' Therefore, the con-
tractor is, or may be, on notice of the precise rules that will
govern the agreement at the time of execution.
The third main difference is the imprecision of the Argen-
tine notion of the administrative contract, which creates an im-
portant area of doubt on the type of contracts subject to the Gov-
ernment's exorbitant contractual powers, as it allows the Govern-
ment to include within it almost any of its contractual
relationships with which it wishes to tamper after the contract
has been executed. While in the United States, there have been
some controversies on the exact reach of the FAR, the area of
doubt seems, to a foreign observer, much smaller in comparison
with the types of contracts which have led to controversies in
Argentina.' - '
From these main differences others have followed. Such is
the case of the undefined coverage of the amendments that the
Argentine Government can introduce in the different contracts,
as the rule is a vague one (amendments should be "reasona-
ble") 132 and no greater precision is generally found in the con-
tract clauses themselves. This contrasts with the "changes
clauses" of the FAR, which relate mainly to the performance of
the contractor.1"' Still another difference is whether the Gov-
ernment can waive, in the agreement, its contractual powers or
rights. The Argentine Supreme Court has held in the nega-
tive,1"4 while such a waiver is expressly admitted by the FAR al-
beit subject to certain procedural safeguards.'
Differences can also be found with reference to the Govern-
ment's power of termination for reasons of public convenience.
In the United States, when the right is not contemplated in the
agreement, termination by the Government for such reasons
would constitute a breach entitling the contractor to be compen-
130. See KEYES, supra n.2, at 41-42.
131. NASH & CIIONIC, supra n.2, at 3-13. See also text accompanying nn.75-82.
132. Decree 1023, supra n.83, Sec. 12.
133. See F.A.R., supra n.3, Sec. 52.243-1 (fixed price supply contracts); Id. Sec.
52.243-4 for fixed price construction contracts. See NASH & CIBINIC, supra n.2, at 381-485
(observing that contractors normally do not contest change orders due to extra com-
pensation that they entail).
134. See supra n.90. The same rule has been advanced in France. See 2 DE
LAUBAD E, supra n.21, at 405, 734.
135. Deviations from the F.A.R. are allowed. F.A.R., supra n.3, Sec. 1.402. See also
KEYES, supra n.2, para. 1.8.
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sated also for loss of profits,' while in Argentina compensation
for loss of profits was doubtful even before the recent regulation
excluded it expressly. 137 It is true that the FAR requires the in-
clusion of a clause granting such right to the Government and
excluding compensation for loss of profits, and that this is one of
the rules considered so fundamental in Government contracts
practice, that it was held to apply even if not expressly provided
in the agreement. However, it appears that a waiver of this right
through a properly authorized deviation is possible.138
In Argentina, instead, such a right cannot be waived by the
Government,1 39 although the consequences of its exercise can
be defined in the contract and such a definition would probably
be upheld. In practice, however, even before the recent regula-
tion excluded compensation for loss of profits, it was very diffi-
cult to include such a clause, as Government lawyers were usually
very reluctant to admit such legal consequences. Moreover, the
broad and imprecise definition of the administrative contract
would allow the Government to claim this power in contracts,
such as roads financed with a toll system or oil concessions,
where long term investments are made by the private contractor
and thus termination of the contract followed by protracted liti-
gation can lead to the bankruptcy of the contractor. Finally, as
will be seen below, the economic and political environments in
which this power is applied are very different in Argentina and
the United States.
VI. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONTRACT DOCTRINE
The summary of the Argentine doctrine of the administra-
tive contract offered above, would lead an observer to conclude
that this doctrine allows the oppression of Government contrac-
tors. Indeed, it could be asked why any private company would
wish to enter into such type of legal relationship. The real situa-
tion is, however, more nuanced.
This is because the courts, provided the contractor has
136. See NASH & CIBINIC, supra n.2, at 1073-74.
137. The Supreme Court had recognized this right in "Eduardo Sdnchez Granel
Obras de Ingenierfa," CSJN [1984] 306 Fallos 1409, but then restricted it somewhat in
'J.C. Ruiz Orrico," CSJN [1993] 316 Fallos 1025.
138. NASH & CIBINIC, supra n.2. See also Christian, supra n.129.
139. Meridiano, supra n.90, at 303.
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respected the applicable time limits in filing its appeals, gener-
ally apply the doctrine equitably, recognizing the prerogatives of
the Government, but also insisting on the respect of the contrac-
tor's economic rights affected thereby. It may be even queried
whether a generous application of the countervailing theories
described in the previous section (coupled, sometimes, with a
weak legal defense by Government's counsel for the reasons ex-
plained below) leads, in effect, to an unfair shifting of the risks
of the agreement on to the Government. Reviewing some prece-
dents, an observer is apt to react as a U.S. specialist on contract
law did with respect to court decisions on Government contracts:
"Government contractors have had unusual success in recouping
unexpected costs of performance"."'
In some cases, however, although this is not clearly spelled
out, the courts appear to use the doctrine of the administrative
contract to curb a perceived drain on the public Treasury caused
by improvident or incorrect Government officers. In these cases,
the courts have resorted to the theory of the administrative con-
tract to escape the solution that would result from the applica-
tion of private law rules, when they consider such solution inap-
propriate. Thus, in Meridiano, 4 ' where a private party had been
granted a concession to use public land for three years with the
right to extend it for seven successive annual periods, and where
the Government had terminated the contract for reasons of pub-
lic convenience during the first annual extension, the Supreme
Court ruled that, being the contractual relation of an adminis-
trative nature, parallel to the concessionaire's right to extend
the agreement, there was the right of the Government to termi-
nate it. The Court thus avoided awarding to the concessionaire
loss of profits for six years, which the concessionaire claimed as
being the whole term of extensions still not exercised, and lim-
ited such right to the profits of the annual period then running.
As can be readily seen, a right to extend a contract is tantamount
to an obligation of the other party to suffer such extension. By
characterizing the contract as "administrative," the Supreme
Court was thus able to destroy the contractual right of the con-
cessionaire and protect the Treasury from paying a substantial
award of damages.
140. KEyEs, supra n.2, at 719 (citing Professor Farnsworth).
141. Meridiano, supra n.90.
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As only a small percentage of contracts generate controver-
sies that reach the courts, the impact of the doctrine should also
be considered in the field of out-of-court relations. It is here
that one can observe the detrimental effects of the doctrine with
more clarity.
Because of the presence of the doctrine of the administra-
tive contract, Government agreements tend to be short, as the
parties rely on legal doctrine and case law to supplement the
brief and generally worded clauses of the contract. If one con-
siders all the rules to which a contractual relationship with the
Government is subject, the contract itself appears to be only the
tip of the iceberg. A great part of the applicable regal regime
will not be spelled out therein but will be found in administra-
tive law treatises, law reports and administrative precedents. A
contractor who works routinely with the Government may pre-
dict with greater certainty than a newcomer, how its contractual
rights and obligations will fare during the life of the agreement.
While to a certain degree this is true in all countries, the more
detailed and specific the contract is, the lesser the advantage
that traditional contractors have over new entrants in the field.
Moreover, no matter how specific the contract is, if the Govern-
ment has an overriding power to amend it, the uncertainty is not
significantly diminished by meticulous drafting. As uncertainty
is reflected in the price bid, the system operates strongly against
newcomers.
Furthermore, a system that allows continuous unilateral
amendments of the contract by the Government, even if grant-
ing a right of compensation to the contractor for such amend-
ments, implies, effectively, a relationship that is subject to con-
tinuous renegotiation. While the competitive bidding process is
generally conducted under severe public scrutiny, subsequent
renegotiations are not always subject to similar publicity. It may
come as no surprise to learn that in such renegotiations, contrac-
tors with political power or savvy fare better than those who lack
such tools. This power need not necessarily imply the existence
of improper dealings, as it may result simply from the impor-
tance of the contract from a political point of view. Thus, the
British companies that were involved in the construction of the
tunnel under the English Channel were, at first, dismissive of the
contrat administratif concept, as a dangerous outgrowth of the al-
ways suspect droit administratif, but finally embraced it enthusias-
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tically when they realized the advantages they could derive from
it.1 4 2
However, in Argentina, favors received, or perceived to have
been received under one Administration, may subject the con-
tractor to stricter control under the next Administration, espe-
cially when the contract requires Government decisions of pub-
lic repercussion, such as the renegotiation of utility rates. Even
in front of a neutral Administration, in long term agreements,
once the contractor has made the required investments, it may
have little leverage to negotiate with the Government.
The efficiency of judicial remedies is therefore an impor-
tant factor in the risk analysis by the contractor. If review of the
Government's decisions by the courts can entail, as it does in the
Argentine federal court system, a five to seven year process, dur-
ing which such decisions must be applied by the contractor until
set aside by the court, the existence of a body of case law protect-
ing the rights of the contractor may be of limited practical im-
portance when evaluating whether to participate in a tender
called by the Government.
An obvious consequence of this analysis is that contractors
who lack political connections are often disinclined to bid for
contracts subject to such rules. This is mainly true of foreign
private contractors since they may consider that their lack of
knowledge of the local scene and lack of local contacts may act
to their detriment. 4 ' From the point of view of both the lack of
legal certainty and the importance of political connections, the
doctrine can thus be said to create a non-tariff barrier to the
entry of foreign contractors.
The doctrine is especially prejudicial in the field of project
finance for public works. When the Government pays for its
works and supplies as these are constructed or provided, it is un-
derstandable that it will try to reserve for itself special powers
and that the contractor will accept such powers, all the more
readily if it can obtain additional compensation when they are
142. Statement made by the Chairman of the company that built the tunnel, in his
speech at the opening ceremony of the International Bar Association meeting in Paris,
1995.
143. This is not necessarily so in the case of foreign State-owned contractors, who
can always rely on the diplomatic pressures brought to bear by their own Governments
in the event of serious discrepancies with the local authorities arising during the life of
the agreement.
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exercised. It can be posited, of course, that the generous grant
of such prerogatives, be it by express contractual agreement or
by a general legal principle, increases the overall cost of Govern-
ment contracting, especially in countries with legal systems
which are not fully developed or trustworthy. This is, however, a
subject pertaining more to the science of administration than to
administrative law.
But when the contract is to be financed by private institu-
tions who are repaid with the exploitation of the facility, Govern-
ment prerogatives that can have the effect of increasing the total
cost to be financed and of delaying the commissioning of the
works, may be unacceptable. Both results, unless capped in the
agreement, can be incompatible with the setting up of bankable
structures. Thus, in a concession of public works which is fi-
nanced through tolls paid by users, the exercise by the Govern-
ment of its right of unilateral termination for reasons of public
convenience, effectively converts a market risk into a sovereign
risk, a conversion which may not be acceptable when the Gov-
ernment's finances are in strait circumstances. 144 Also, the
launching of private projects that require the construction of fa-
cilities within Government properties, for instance in an area
within a public port, the use of which is granted to the project
company under a concession agreement, may be hampered if
the Government is to recognize the right of unilateral termina-
tion of such agreement for reasons of public convenience.
Thus, the effect of the doctrine of the administrative contract
may well be to prevent the use of project finance in many Gov-
ernment, as well as private, initiatives.
Moreover, in political regimes or jurisdictions that are not
subject to effective judicial control, the power of the Govern-
ment's contracting officer to terminate practically at will any
contract, alleging reasons of public convenience (which the
courts will rarely scrutinize), without compensating loss of prof-
144. This was perceived by the Government when in 2000 it tried to set up a legal
regime for the financing of infrastructure projects ("the Infrastructure Regime"). It
became clear in the negotiations with the private banks and construction companies
that the former were not willing to finance contracts that could be amended or termi-
nated at will by the Government. The resulting legal regime effectively allowed the Gov-
ernment contracting officers to waive these rights. See Decree No. 1299, Dec. 29, 2000,
Sec. 19, [LXI-A] A.D.L.A. 222. Due to the ensuing economic crisis this regime was
never implemented.
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its, gives the contracting officer an enormous power over the
contractor. Frequent changes of economic policy in successive
Administrations may provoke, or at least mask, the abusive exer-
cise of such right. The problem is compounded when compen-
sation even for termination costs may require lengthy litigation
and a lengthier payment schedule, thus permitting a given Ad-
ministration to enjoy the often positive political effects of recov-
ering an asset or activity for the Government, and imposing on a
future and different Administration the cost of such recovery.
Lack of transparency and accountability are thus the price of rec-
ognizing this Government prerogative so broadly.
VII. POSSIBLE SOL UTIONS
The main difference between the doctrine of the adminis-
trative contract and the rules that apply to Government contracts
in legal regimes that do not recognize this doctrine may be
stated as follows: in the former the rights and obligations of the
parties are found mainly in the case law and in the writings of
legal authors, while in the latter they are spelled out with greater
precision in the contract itself. Therefore, it could be argued,
this difference could be substantially reduced, and the problems
caused by the administrative contract doctrine greatly attenu-
ated, if Argentine Government contracts were to include more
detailed stipulations.
The solution, however, is not so simple. In practice, the
Government seldom includes in the contract clauses that grant
full and precise protection to the rights of the contractor. Gov-
ernment contracts are drafted by public officers who can be po-
litically vulnerable if the terms of the contract put forward by the
Government appear too favorable to the contractor. The con-
tentions that some bidders may be dissuaded from participating
and that the resulting price of the contract is higher than what
could have been obtained with more reasonable terms, are
neither easily proven nor politically suspect. The FAR cautions
that "[t] he cost to the taxpayer of attempting to eliminate all risk
is prohibitive.""14 No similar directive is found in Argentine reg-
ulations on Government contracts. Thus, often the contract is
generous in recognizing the Government prerogatives, draco-
nian in imposing fines on the contractor in case of its default,
145. F.A.R., supra n.3, Sec. 1.102-2(c) (2).
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and skimpy in the description of the latter's rights. The contrac-
tor is thus left to invoke the general countervailing rights de-
scribed above and hope that their application by the Administra-
tion or by the courts will be fair.
Additionally, the general scope of the Government's power
to amend the terms of the contract defeats a solution based on
more precise drafting. No matter how carefully the contract is
drafted, and no matter what limits are included therein for the
exercise of the public prerogatives, the carefully drafted protec-
tive clauses of the agreement will be of no avail if the Govern-
ment is to have an overriding amendment power. One may well
question the point of drafting the contract meticulously if the
Government will anyway have the power to change any aspect of
it "reasonably." Should every clause of the agreement be pref-
aced by the words "it is of the essence of this agreement that. .
so as to make it less subject to unilateral change?
The doctrine of the administrative contract thus sacrifices a
precise determination of the rights and obligations of the parties
to the need to maintain the power of the Government to intro-
duce changes or terminate the agreement for reasons of public
convenience. Practice shows that Government lawyers consider
this power of the utmost importance.
A doctrine that maximizes the discretion of the Govern-
ment and forces the contractor to comply with its decisions, sub-
ject to whatever additional compensation the contractor may ne-
gotiate with the Government or obtain from a judicial award,
places great emphasis on the following factors: the quality of the
civil service, the speed and cost of the judicial process, the inde-
pendence of both the civil service and the judiciary from politi-
cal pressures, and the solvency of the Government.
In Argentina, conditions that would moderate the effects of
the doctrine of the administrative contract do not always exist.
There is no civil service career that attracts well trained and
highly qualified professionals as happens in France. Such pro-
fessionals, when they work for the Government, are generally po-
litical appointees who change with every Administration. Ob-
taining judicial recognition of a right of compensation against
the federal Government may take more than five years, as the
case must go through a stage of administrative review and three
levels of courts. Litigation can also be very costly due to the im-
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pact of the court tax and the legal regime on counsel fees.' 4"
Collection entails a separate administrative procedure,
which can last two more years."' 7 Furthermore, in recent years,
Congress has enacted two laws consolidating the debts of the
Government vis-A-vis different creditors, including contractors,
whose claims had been recognized by the courts, paying them
with dollar-denominated Government bonds with a maturity of
sixteen years. "'
Apart from redressing of Argentine public finances, two
other conditions should be fulfilled to reduce the problems
caused by the administrative contract doctrine in Argentina.
The first is the enactment of a new federal statute on Govern-
ment contracts. An essential rule of that statute should be the
validity of any contractual clause limiting or waiving Government
prerogatives.'4 " Procedural safeguards, such as requiring spe-
cific approval by a high ranking public officer, could be required
for such limitation or waiver. 151 But the contractor should be
able to rely on the respect by the Government of the agreed
terms and conditions. A clear rule providing the appropriate
time the contractor can suspend performance in case of Govern-
ment's default would also be important. Such a regulation could
fix a standard delay in Government's payments after which the
suspension would be valid, allowing the contracting officer to set
in the contract's specifications a different term when so required
by the characteristics of the case.
Given that the problem is common to other Latin American
countries, and that it may be difficult for Government officers to
generate political support for such an initiative, query whether
146. To file an action in the federal courts, a court tax equal to three percent of
the amount of the claim must be paid by plaintiff at the beginning of the lawsuit, al-
though it is recoverable from defendant if the action succeeds (Law No. 23898, Oct. 23,
1990, [L-D] A.D.L.A. 3751. As a rule, the loser pays the legal fees of the winner. CoD.
PROC. Civ. Y COM., Sec. 68. Legal fees are calculated as a percentage of the amount of
the claim and can well reach thirty percent thereof if the case is taken up to the appel-
late level. Law No. 21839, Jul. 14, 1978, [XXXVIII-C] A.D.L.A. 2412, Secs. 6, 7. Pursu-
ant to Sec. 505 of the C6D. Civ., legal fees cannot exceed twenty-five percent of the
amount of the controversy for all work done at the lower court level.
147. This follows from the regime provided in Sec. 68 of the Permanent Budget
Law, text restated in 1999. Decree No. 689, June 30, 1999, [LIX-C] A.D.L.A. 2765,
2775.
148. Law No. 23982 and Law No. 25344, supra n.9.
149. See supra n. 144.
150. Id.
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the drafting of a model law of Government contracts by interna-
tional or regional lending agencies could accelerate the pro-
cess.
15 1
The second condition is the creation of a mechanism to re-
solve quickly and economically the controversies that arise from
the performance of Government contracts. This mechanism
could be either a special administrative court allowing for subse-
quent judicial review, or preferably, an arbitral tribunal set up
for each contract. Under either alternative, the possibility of
granting interim relief while the validity of the Government's or-
der challenged by the contractor is determined, should be pro-
vided. 152
Such a mechanism would benefit not only the private con-
tractor. For the Government, greater and more immediate re-
spect of the contractor's rights should increase the number of
firms willing to participate in public procurement procedures; in
turn, it could lead to lower price bids, especially in long term
contracts. Also, a quicker resolution of the controversies would
have a double advantage for the Government. It would reduce
the risk of arbitrary decisions by the contracting officers taken
for political reasons, since the consequences of such decisions
would normally be known while the same officer remains in his
post and, not, as it now happens, impact a future Administra-
tion. The controversy would be tried while the contracting of-
ficer remains involved in the contract, or at least is still in office,
thus facilitating the presentation of the Government's case and
the production of its evidence. At present, instead, when the
matter reaches the evidentiary stage at the courts, several years
have elapsed since the contract was terminated or the contro-
versy arose, making it often difficult for the Government lawyers
to obtain guidance from their client on the facts of the case, or
even to contact the officers who were in charge at the time of
controversy.
151. Work towards the adoption of uniform rules on private finance for Govern-
ment infrastructure projects has been carried out by the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL").
152. The Infrastructure Regime mentioned above also provided for arbitration.
See Decree No. 1299, supra n.144, Sec. 30.
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CONCLUSION
The existence of special contractual prerogatives for the
Government is a feature of many legal regimes, whether they re-
sult from laws, regulations, case law, or contractual terms. Given
the public interests protected by the Government, such preroga-
tives are not, in themselves, questionable. What is open to criti-
cism, however, is the prerogatives' sudden intrusion, by a mere
decision of the contracting agency, in contracts that do not pro-
vide for them; they are not subject to laws that so provide; and
they lack precision in those contracts to which they apply. In
certain cases, the mere existence of Government prerogatives
may make the contract unviable. The wish to protect fully the
public interest becomes, in the end, self-defeating. Further-
more, public interest is not univocal. Apart from the interest in
keeping the performance of the contract attuned at all times to
the public needs, there is the interest of the Treasury not to pay
high prices for the goods and services it acquires. 53 This aspect
is seldom considered in Argentina, as the field of Government
contracts appears to be studied more by lawyers than by econo-
mists or experts in public administration.
The author has argued that the main defect of the Argen-
tine doctrine of the administrative contract is the undue general-
ization of rules that can be justified mainly in public works or
supply agreements, or in those subject to the Government's reg-
ulatory powers, such as a concession to operate a public utility.' 54
Legal writing on the subject often starts from a description of
the legal regime of these contracts and then passes impercepti-
bly into a prescription of that regime for all contracts that can be
characterized as administrative. The impossibility of extending
such a regime to the very different types of contracts encom-
passed by the imprecise definition of the "administrative con-
tract," coupled with the preference of the courts, specialized au-
153. The existence of differing public interests became very clear during the dis-
cussions that led to the enactment of the Infrastructure Regime. Four sectors were rep-
resented: the Treasury, the Ministry of Public Works, private banks and private con-
struction companies. The main divide was not public vs. private interests, as could have
been predicted, but between those who paid (the Treasury and the banks, who insisted
on firm price contracts) and those who spent or collected the money (the Ministry of
Public Works and the construction companies, who coincided in their wish to retain the
Government's power to amend the contract).
154. Mairal, supra ni., at 659.
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thors, and Government lawyers to apply the doctrine broadly, at
present throw a shadow of uncertainty over many contractual re-
lations entered into by the Argentine Government. To believe
that the market does not recognize this as a risk, and thus as a
cost factor, is unrealistic. Of the many circumstances that influ-
ence a country's cost for raising capital, and the prices it pays for
the public procurement of goods and services, the circumstance
of legal certainty is one that lies entirely in its own hands and can
be solved, or attenuated, relatively quickly. It is just a question of
recognizing the problem and dealing with it.
